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I. INTRODUCTION
During the preceding two year period,' the Florida courts have dealt
with a surprising number of first impression cases. A number of other
cases required dramatic broadening of existing rules to new factual situa-
tions. It is often difficult to ascertain if the courts were articulating new
rules or enlarging old ones; at times, it is obvious that the courts were not
quite certain either.
The 1965 Legislature indulged in piece-meal legislative changes and
additions which amounted to mere encrustations upon an already un-
wieldy judicial structure. The common law marriage anachronism re-
mained untouched by the Legislature. No attempt was made to unify the
jurisdiction of juvenile courts throughout the state. A number of critical
questions remained unanswered. Why should there continue to be a "no-
man's land" between the circuit and juvenile courts in child custody mat-
ters which requires gap-filling by the courts? Why should a former wife
be entitled to attorney's fees in defending a custody order in chancery
but not in habeas corpus? Florida's patchwork quilt of family law is in
need of replacement.
II. MARRIAGE AND ANNULMENT
A. Common Law Marriages
The archaic concept of common law marriage has continued to plague
the courts. The usual rule that there is a strong presumption of the valid-
ity of a second ceremonial marriage has been extended to a situation in-
volving an alleged common law marriage which was preceded by another
alleged common law marriage.2 It is submitted that the giving of pre-
sumptive validity to a common law marriage, simply because it is the
second marriage, is an unfortunate extension of the presumption rule.
The proponent of the alleged second common law marriage should bear
the burden of proving the existence of this marriage without the aid of
any presumption that the first common law marriage has been dissolved
by death or divorce.
The Third District Court of Appeal has expressly rejected the rule of
ex necessitate rei which allegedly was an exception to the dead man's
statutes permitting the wife to testify to an alleged common law marriage
in cases where there would not be any other means of proving the mar-
riage.4 Under this holding it would appear that unless an alleged spouse
1. The material herein surveyed includes the statutes enacted by the 1965 General
Session, the first Extra-Session and the second Extra-Session of the Florida Legislature, and
the cases reported from 155 So.2d 353 through 177 So.2d 328.
2. Sikes v. Guest, 170 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
3. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1965).
4. Silverman v. Lerner, 163 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). When a proffer of a wit-
ness to an alleged common law marriage is made and his interest is indirect or of a doubtful
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can clearly show that the reputation of the parties in the community was
that of husband and wife, she has no effective way to prove the marriage
unless the contract was witnessed by disinterested third parties-a rather
rare event. On the other hand, a woman who claims to be the common law
wife, and who sues for the wrongful death of her alleged husband, should
be allowed to testify as to the common law marriage over the defendant's
assertion of the dead man's statute. This statute only applies to bar the
testimony when it is introduced in a suit against an executor, or adminis-
trator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee or survivors of
the deceased person. It has no application when the defendant is not
such a party.5
In a case of first impression,6 the third district has held unmarried,
for the purposes of a Florida wrongful death action, a man and woman
who lived together in Puerto Rico (which does not recognize common law
marriages) and who were never ceremonially married in Puerto Rico or
elsewhere. The court went on to hold that there would not be a common
law marriage even under Florida law, since the couple "intended to get
married but had not gotten around to it."'7 Finally, the court held that the
domicile of the father determines the legitimacy of the children of this
union. The case was remanded to the trial court to make a determination
of the legitimacy status of the children under the law of Puerto Rico.
B. Plural Ceremonial Marriages
The Florida Supreme Court, in reversing the district court,8 has
held that when both parties innocently enter into a marriage which is
bigamous because both of them have spouses, the court has the power
to grant a "divorce" to either party under the Florida statute.9 The court
also has the power to enter a child support award in favor of the children
of this union and to dispose of the property rights of the parties. The
court may further award the "wife" temporary attorney's fees, but not
permanent attorney's fees and permanent alimony.
In Grace v. Grace'0 the court articulated three rules governing col-
nature, "the objection goes to the credit of the witness and not to his competency" and
he is competent to testify under the Dead Man's Statute. In re Lynagh's Estate, 177 So.2d
256, 258 (Fla. 2d'Dist. 1965).
5. Smart v. Foosaner, 169 So.2d 508 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
6. Young v. Viruet de Garcia, 172 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
7. Id. at 244.
8. Burger v. Burger, 166 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1964), reversing in part Burger v. Burger,
156 So.2d 905 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). Both parties thought they had secured valid divorces
in Mexico from their original spouses; however, the Mexican "magistrate" fraudulently
furnished them with forged divorce decrees and both parties at the time of their "marriage"
thought that they were capable of marriage.
9. FLA. STAT. § 65.04(9) (1965).
10. Grace v. Grace, 162 So.2d 315, 317 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1964). A spouse has no standing
to contest his spouse's previous decree of divorce (which is not void on its face) from a
prior spouse. Coltun v. Coltun, 167 So.2d 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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lateral attacks upon a divorce and its effect upon a subsequent marriage:
(1) The presumption in favor of the validity of a second ceremonial mar-
riage is so strong that it rebuts the presumption of the continuation of
the first marriage, and, in the absence of competent proof to the contrary,
it is to be assumed that the previous marriage has been dissolved by
divorce. This test of "competent proof to the contrary"'1 would not be
met when the wife admitted that she had never established residence in
any other state than Florida and New Jersey except "temporary residence
to get a divorce in Montgomery, Alabama." 2 (2) That the husband of
the second marriage who had lived with his alleged wife for four years
and had accepted all the marital benefits and privileges during this time
should not be allowed to raise the question of his wife's securing an in-
valid divorce from her first husband. This denial is not predicated upon
an estoppel, but upon the clean hands doctrine. (3) The husband to the
second marriage was a stranger to the first marriage. He cannot collater-
ally attack the divorce decree, because he did not occupy a status or have
a right at the time of the entry of the decree. The husband was a stranger
to the decree, and he may attack it only when it is being enforced against
him so as to affect rights or interests acquired by him prior to the rendi-
tion of the decree.
Even if the parties to a purported marriage are lacking in capacity
to contract a valid marriage (because both parties have an un-divorced
spouse), the mother of any children of such bigamous union has standing
to seek child support and resolution of the party's rights, as tenants in
common, of the home which they had purported to acquire as tenants by
the entirety. 13 On the other hand, a wife who has contracted a second
bigamous marriage is estopped from making any claim as a widow to
the estate of her deceased first husband. 4 Somewhat the converse situa-
tion was presented in Mason v. Mason.'5 The court held that a wife who
knows that her husband has "married" another woman (who thought
that her "husband" had capacity to marry) is estopped from claiming
any interest in property purchased jointly by the husband and his second
"wife" (who had substantially contributed towards the purchase price)
by her failure to assert her marital status during the period of the second
"marriage." The third district seemingly approved the lower court's hold-
ing which was that the husband was estopped to deny the right of the
second "wife" to take title to the jointly held property by right of sur-
vivorship, and that this estoppel was binding upon the first wife who takes
as "heir" of her husband.
11. Grace v. Grace, 162 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
12. Id. at 317.
13. Whitfield v. Whitfield, 161 So.2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
14. In re Moye's Estate, 160 So.2d 525 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).




A woman who has gone through a marriage ceremony as a result of
hypnosis, induced by her alleged husband, and who has not consummated
the marriage may have the marriage annulled; she may also secure a
judgment against him for money had and received, where she gave him
funds while under the influence of his hypnotic spell.'6
III. JURISDICTION FOR DIVORCE AND POST-DECRETAL RELIEF
A. Residence
A domicile of choice may be acquired by the presence of a person
plus his intent to make it his home permanently, or for an "indefinite
period" of time. Hence, it will be assumed that a Cuban refugee whose
presence in Florida is permitted by Federal law under a temporary basis
will be permitted to remain for an "indefinite period."" As a consequence
of this reasoning, aliens with a refugee status may acquire a domicile
sufficient to allow the courts to have jurisdiction over divorce actions.
B. Jurisdiction over the Parties
In a case of first impression, the district court has held that when
a wife files suit for alimony unconnected with divorce,'8 and a decree pro
confesso is entered against the husband, it is erroneous to enter a final
decree of divorce pursuant to a "motion for the entry of a final decree
of divorce"" which was filed by the wife after the final hearing. This
result obtains unless the husband is given reasonable notice of this motion
which, in effect, constitutes an amendment of the wife's initial cause of
action. The court specifically refused to decide whether the court lacked
jurisdiction over the husband because he was served with a complaint for
separate maintenance rather than a complaint for divorce.
When the parties to a divorce case have formed separate corpora-
tions to carry on separate retail businesses, it is error to order that the
inventory of one corporation be transferred to another when the corpora-
tions are not parties to the divorce proceedings.20 However, it is im-
proper to join corporations as parties defendant to a divorce suit when
the only relief asked against them is a restraining order to enjoin the sale
of their assets.2 '
Corporations and other third parties, who are enjoined without notice
16. Peller v. Kisiel, 161 So.2d 573 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
17. Perez v. Perez, 164 So.2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
18. Under FLA. STAT. § 65.09 (1963).
19. Kitchens v. Kitchens, 162 So.2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
20. Turner v. Turner, 175 So.2d 47 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
21. Thoni Transp. Co. v. Thoni, 155 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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in post-decretal proceedings from transferring or disposing of certain
assets allegedly controlled by the former husband, have a right to object
to this procedure before the court which issued the injunction. A writ of
prohibition will not issue from the district court because the circuit court
does have jurisdiction, although it may be acting improperly.22
In a case decided subsequent to the writing of this survey,23 the
second district has held that a stockbrokerage firm, which received oral
notice from a court that the firm had been enjoined from paying money
to a husband from his brokerage account, was bound by the injunction
and was liable to the wife for the sums of money disbursed to the husband
in violation of the injunction. This was true even though the brokerage
firm had never been made a party to the divorce action.
It is rather difficult to draw a consistent theme from these four cases.
It is submitted that there ought to be a simple, speedy mechanism for the
proper joinder and enjoining of corporations as parties defendant in
divorce suits because of the widespread use of the "one-man" corpora-
tion in modem business practices.
A court which retains jurisdiction in the divorce decree over the
custody of children has jurisdiction to modify the decree at a later date
(upon the petition of the former wife) in order to restrain the husband
from assaulting, harrassing, annoying or berating her. The jurisdiction
is predicated upon the basis that the forbidden actions are adverse to the
welfare of the minor children24 who are in the former wife's custody.
IV. DIVORCE
A. Defenses and Evidence
During the last two years, the Florida courts did not decide any
significant cases dealing with the grounds for divorce, 25 and only one case
dealt with defenses in which the court held that although the failure of
a husband to seek a reconciliation will constitute a defense to his suit for
desertion against his wife, it will not do so when the case is founded upon
the charge of cruelty.26
The courts did decide some interesting cases dealing with the privi-
lege against self-incrimination and corroboration. In Stockham v. Stock-
22. State v. Hall, 175 So.2d 792 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
23. Hill, Darlington & Grimm v. Duggar, 177 So.2d 734 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
24. Bazzano v. Bazzano, 175 So.2d 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
25. In Patterson v. Patterson, 177 So.2d 254, 255 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), the district
court, in reversing the chancellor, held that evidence that a wife was seen in bed with a
man while she was wearing a shortie night gown and he was in his underwear, and
"when a light was flashed through the window he was caressing her buttocks" was sufficient
to sustain a charge of adultery against the wife.
26. Rodda v. Rodda, 159 So.2d 259 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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ham2" the court held, as a matter of first impression, that if the plaintiff
refuses to answer requests for admissions which deal with the defendant's
affirmative defense (apparently adultery) because the answers might tend
to incriminate her, it is proper for the court to order her to answer and
to dismiss her divorce action if she fails to do so. The holding was based
upon a Florida rule of civil procedure which provides that "any admission
made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pend-
ing action only and neither constitutes an admission by him for any other
purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding."" As a
corollary of this rule, if the plaintiff wife (when questioned as an adverse
witness) invokes her privilege against self-incrimination and then does
answer the questions to her disadvantage after the chancellor informs her
that he will dismiss her complaint if she fails to do so, it will not be error. 9
A general rule requires that the plaintiff's testimony be corroborated
in a divorce action. However, when it seems clear that there is no collu-
sion since the defendant has vigorously contested the action in good faith,
the courts will be satisfied with less corroboration than would otherwise
be required.80
B. Res Judicata and Estoppel by Judgment
In order for res judicata to be applicable, the second proceedings
must involve the same cause of action as the first proceedings. Hence, a
foreign separate maintenance decree which found the husband to be at
fault for the separation of the parties would not be res judicata to the
husband's suit for divorce in Florida based upon the desertion of the
wife. The doctrine of estoppel by judgment precludes the parties from
litigating in a second case issues which were actually decided in the first
case even though the causes of action were different. The doctrine of
estoppel by judgment would be applicable only if the party asserting this
defense shows what facts and issues were actually litigated in the first
suit.3'
V. VACATING OF DECREES
Bills in the nature of Bills of Review have been abolished by the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; 1 2 however, an independent action may
be brought to set aside a decree for fraud committed upon the court.
Nevertheless, an allegation that a wife's attorney "failed in his duty to
27. Stockham v. Stockham, 159 So.2d 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), aff'd, 168 So.2d 320
(Fla. 1964).
28. FLa. R. Civ. P. 1.30(b).
29. Lund v. Lund, 161 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
30. Dings v. Dings, 161 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
31. Hohweiler v. Hohweiler, 167 So.2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). The fact that a wife
secured a decree of separate maintenance in New York would not necessarily be res judicata
of the husband's suit for divorce in Florida. Katz v. Katz, 159 So.2d 241 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964).
32. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.38.
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present certain evidence which she had furnished him"33 is not sufficient,
in the absence of any allegations that the court was led into error by the
actions of the plaintiff-husband.
A non-resident wife, who has been properly served with notice by
publication of the fact of her husband's suit for divorce in Florida, may
not institute suit to set aside the divorce decree after the death of the
husband upon the main grounds that: (1) The husband was not a resi-
dent of Florida; and (2) The husband had failed to disclose to the court
the fact that a separate maintenance decree had been entered against him
in New York. The wife is precluded from attacking the decree for lack
of jurisdiction; she could have raised this defense in the original pro-
ceedings. Further, the prior New York separate maintenance decree is
not a bar to a subsequent divorce suit and the husband's failure to dis-
close this decree is not a fraud upon the Florida court.34
Under the Florida statutes,5 a declaratory decree action may not be
utilized to attack the validity of a Mexican divorce decree. However, a
complaint which alleges that the Mexican decree is void may be sustained




It would appear that if the wife has liquid assets sufficient to main-
tain herself in reasonable comfort pending a final divorce hearing, a court
should not award temporary alimony even though the record may dis-
close that the husband is able to pay it. Of course, if the chancellor should
see fit to award permanent alimony, he may consider the amounts spent
by the wife for her own support during the pendency of the action in
determining the amount of the permanent alimony. In short, the denial
of temporary alimony may only be a temporary victory for the husband.
In a somewhat contrary vein, it is seemingly proper to refuse to give a
wife credit for her one-half of the funds which she expended from a joint
bank account to support herself during the pendency of a divorce when,
because of the ample amount of the joint account, she is unable to show
undue financial hardship."'
In a case of first impression,89 the second district has held that a
33. Irving v. Irving, 157 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
34. Simons v. Miami Beach First Natl Bank, 157 So.2d 199 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
The wife also attacked the decree because it incorrectly stated that she had answered the
complaint and also that after she had received notice of the suit, her husband had lulled
her into inaction.
35. FLA. STAT. ch. 87 (1965).
36. Kittel v. Kittel, 164 So.2d 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
37. Grace v. Grace, 162 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
38. Gaer v. Gaer, 168 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
39. Holiday Hosp. Ass'n v. Schwarz, 166 So.2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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husband, who has separated from his wife and who has instituted divorce
proceedings because of her misconduct, is not liable to a hospital for
expenses incurred by her subsequent to the entry of an award of tem-
porary alimony when the award was being complied with by the husband
at the time of the wife's hospitalization. It should be noted that while the
wife would be in a position to ask for an increase in the award of tem-
porary alimony because of her hospitalization, a similar right is not ac-
corded third parties who deal with the wife.
It is error for a chancellor, in an emergency hearing, to enter an
award of temporary alimony before process is served upon the husband
and without giving him notice of the application for the award; however,
if the chancellor reviews the prior order on the merits upon the husband's
motion to vacate the award and adheres to it, this will cure the improper
procedure.40
B. Permanent Alimony
The third district has articulated the view that it favors final decrees
which provide that the husband is to maintain life insurance in favor of
his wife and children, but stated, "while such provision should be en-
couraged in property settlements, we hold that this provision in the decree
is not supported by the record ... and must be stricken."'" The reversal
was based entirely upon the lack of the financial capacity of the husband.
It is reversible error for a chancellor to fail to reserve jurisdiction to
award alimony in the future merely because the wife is self-supporting at
the time of the divorce. A change in circumstances in the future may re-
quire an award of alimony and the ex-wife would be barred from applying
for it unless the court retained jurisdiction.42
The practicing lawyer's adage that persons of moderate means can-
not afford a divorce is borne out by Bennett v. Bennett13 Here it was held
that an award of gixty dollars per month child support and sixty dollars
per month for alimony from a husband whose net earnings amounted to
four hundred dollars per month was inadequate. The wife had testified
that it would require a minimum of two hundred and seventy-one dollars
per month to support herself and one child, and that she was forced by
the decree to make mortgage payments on the home, and payments for
utility charges and a number of furniture and finance obligations. The
40. Voss v. Voss, 169 So.2d 351 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
41. Wilson v. Wilson, 163 So.2d 45 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). The court also modified the
final decree by providing that the husband was responsible for all major medical bills of
his ex-wife and his children and for all major maintenance and repair bills for the home
occupied by the wife and children. This modification was based solely upon the financial
condition of the husband.
42. Dings v. Dings, 161 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
43. 158 So.2d 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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case was remanded for the entry of an amended decree. A chancellor's lot
is not a happy one.
C. Appeals of Alimony Awards
Rule 3.8(b) of the Florida Appellate Rules seemingly articulates
the notion that it is necessary for a wife who intends to appeal from a
final decree awarding her alimony to apply to the trial court for an award
of temporary alimony pending the appeal. Accordingly, the district courts
have held that a wife is estopped to maintain the appeal if she accepts the
permanent alimony specified in the final decree. 4 In reversing this trend,
the Florida Supreme Court has held that Rule 3.8(b) of the Florida Ap-
pellate Rules is remedial in nature and not mandatory.45 If the husband
is not prejudiced or injured by the wife's receiving the permanent alimony
"there is no waiver or estoppel in merely the payment or receipt of the
alimony pursuant to order of court [the trial court] ."" This holding of
the Florida Supreme Court also affects appeals from post-decretal orders
modifying alimony awards, and this will be discussed in a subsequent
section of this Survey.4 7
D. Lump Sum Alimony
In awarding lump sum alimony, the chancellor, in addition to con-
sidering the financial worth of the parties, must take into account the
age and life expectancy of the wife, and it is error to award a sum which
will support her for five or six years when she has a much longer life ex-
pectancy." In addition, an award of lump sum alimony should not be
based upon the relative merits of the personal lives of the parties, nor as
a salve to the wife's feelings."'
A Florida court has no jurisdiction to award to the wife a non-
resident husband's interest in a Florida tenancy by the entirety as lump
sum alimony unless he is personally served with process in Florida, or
unless the notice of publication for constructive service describes the
property and informs the husband that the wife is asserting a claim
against it.50
44. Claus v. Claus, 163 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964); Brackin v. Brackin, 167 So.2d
604 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) ; Hadley v. Hadley, 140 So.2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
45. Brackin v. Brackin, 182 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1966), reversing Brackin v. Brackin, 167 So.2d
604 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
46. Id. at 6-7.
47. Notes 63-65, infra.
48. Sommers v. Sommers, 169 So.2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
49. Olsen v. Olsen, 158 So.2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); for further proceedings, see
Olsen v. Olsen, 172 So.2d 276 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
50. Webb v. Webb, 156 So.2d 698 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). This holding would appear to
be in accord with the case of Torchiana v. Torchiana, 111 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1959) which




An interesting aspect of the doctrine of res judicata was applied in
Durham v. Ellis.5' In Durham a chancellor awarded the wife six thousand
dollars as lump sum alimony. This award was predicated upon the hus-
band's testimony that he was the holder of a mortgage (with a balance of
eighteen thousand dollars) when the mortgage was, in fact, payable to the
husband and wife, and was, therefore, payable to them as tenants in com-
mon (by operation of law after a divorce). Two years later, the wife
brought suit to collect her share of the mortgage, and the husband counter-
claimed to reform it. Despite the fact that the lower court admitted in the
second suit that in the first suit it had "inadvertently, as a matter of law,
brought an unjust enrichment to the wife,"52 the second district denied
that the chancellor had any power to order restitution of the six thousand
dollar lump sum alimony from the wife's nine thousand dollar share of
the mortgage because of the doctrine of res judicata.
E. Modification of Alimony Awards
In a case of first impression in Florida, the second district has held
that a Florida court does not have jurisdiction to modify alimony 5 when
the marriage, divorce and the entry of the alimony decree all took place
out of Florida, and when the wife has never submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Florida court.54
In the last two years the Florida courts have continued to articulate
standards for determining when there has been a change in circumstances
which would justify a modification of an alimony award. When a hus-
band's financially worsened condition has been caused in substantial part
by his voluntary agreement to pay his ex-wife large annual sums for her
interest in jointly held property, it is not an abuse of discretion for the
chancellor to refuse to reduce the amount of alimony and child support
payments.55 An order modifying an award of alimony should be based
upon a change in the financial conditions of the parties and the husband's
ability to pay, not upon the fraudulent or inequitable conduct of the
ex-wife.5"
Inasmuch as the modification of an alimony award is based upon a
change in circumstances, "the clean hands doctrine has a limited applica-
tion, 5 7 and the refusal of the chancellor to apply it would seem to be a
matter of discretion. Further, a chancellor, in the proper exercise of his
discretion, may make the modification effective on a date subsequent to
51. 157 So.2d 185 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
52. Id. at 187, 189.
53. Under FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1963).
54. Borst v. Borst, 161 So.2d 693 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
55. Bergh v. Bergh, 160 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
56. Glass v. Glass, 166 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
57. Simon v. Simon, 155 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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the filing of the petition for modification but prior to the date of the final
hearing.
A Florida statute58 provides that alimony or support provisions of a
separation agreement, which were incorporated into a divorce decree, may
be modified under certain circumstances. However, when the separation
agreement provides for the complete division of the property of the
parties, the wife has thereby relinquished her interest in property of the
husband, and he, in return, has agreed to pay her a fixed sum so long as
she should live and does not remarry, the court has no power to rewrite
the contract of the parties and may not modify it in favor of the husband
even if there has been a change of circumstances.59 On the other hand, it is
proper for a court to relieve a father of the obligation to pay one-half of
the mortgage payments on the home occupied by his divorced wife and his
minor child (which was ordered under a prior decree) when the ex-hus-
band has conveyed his interest in the home to his ex-wife and she has
remarried and is living with her new husband on the property.60
In the event that a divorced wife should incur unusually large medi-
cal bills after an award of permanent alimony, she may move for a modifi-
cation of the award upon the basis of a change in circumstances. 6' How-
ever, it is error for a chancellor to reduce alimony payments in an amount
which is equal to the amount that the ex-husband must pay for the hos-
pitalization of an adult daughter which occurred subsequent to the award
of alimony. A more equitable solution would be to require the former
spouses to share the hospitalization expenses equally.62
As stated in a preceding section of this Survey,63 the Florida Supreme
Court has now held that a wife who accepts the payment of alimony under
a divorce decree will not be estopped to contest the amount of the alimony
upon appeal unless the husband is able to show that he is prejudiced in
some manner by the receipt and payment of the alimony. The Florida
Supreme Court,64 in affirming the second district,65 has extended this rule
to hold that when a post-decretal order has reduced the amount of ali-
mony, the former wife may accept the reduced amounts ordered by the
trial court without being estopped to appeal the modifying award. The
58. FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1963).
59. Howell v. Howell, 164 So.2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). When property rights
have become fixed by the final decree and the decree fails to retain jurisdiction of the
case, the chancellor does not have the power to modify the decree. Rogers v. Rogers, 175
So.2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
60. In the Interest of P.A.R., 168 So.2d 710 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
61. Clutter v. Clutter, 171 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
62. Brill v. Brill, 173 So.2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
63. Notes 44-46 supra.
64. Blue v, Blue, 183 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1966). It would appear that the holding of
Fort v. Fort, 167 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) has been tacitly overruled by the Blue
case.
65. Blue v. Blue, 172 So.2d 502 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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wife may petition the trial court for an award of temporary alimony under
the Florida Appellate Rules," but she is not obliged to do so.
F. Enforcement of Alimony Awards
When a foreign state's decree for alimony and child support is sought
to be enforced in Florida by making it a domestic decree, it is error to
incorporate the terms of the foreign decree by reference without clearly
specifying the terms and provisions of the foreign decree which are being
made a part of the Florida decree.67
A former husband who moves to vacate a judgment for arrearages
of alimony and child support under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure68
must set forth a meritorious defense to his former wife's allegations as to
the amount of the arrearages. Therefore, the mere fact that a former
husband's attorneys withdrew from the case with the consent of a chan-
cellor (who made a notation on the court file jacket that he was going
to recuse himself, but entered no order of recusation), and that the hear-
ing on the motion for judgment was not attended by either the former
husband or his attorneys was not prejudicial to him in the absence of any
meritorious defense to the wife's claim.69
It is proper for a chancellor to refuse to award a money judgment
for accrued support payments under a property settlement agreement
when another division of the same circuit has enjoined the executor of the
deceased former wife's estate from proceeding with the litigation. How-
ever, the refusal to award the money judgment must provide that it is
interlocutory pending the disposition of the former husband's separate
suit which seeks the reformation or cancellation of the property settle-
ment agreement.
In proceedings, supplemental to a divorce decree, which involve the
enforcement of alimony, the defendant is not entitled to actual service of
process but only to adequate and reasonable notice of the proceedings.
Hence, if notice is sent to the defendant in a foreign state by mail and
two of his attorneys appear at the hearing, even though only as "specta-
tors," and the arrearages of alimony were paid to the former wife by one
of these attorneys during the pendency of the proceedings, the husband
has received adequate and reasonable notice. Further, if a Florida mort-
gagor owes money to the non-resident former husband and receives notice
by lis pendens of the suit for enforcement, he may intervene in the pro-
ceedings 7' and a "Petition for Interpleader" by the mortgagor will be
66. FLA. R. App. P. 3.8(b).
67. Tischler v. Tischler, 173 So.2d 769 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
68. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38.
69. Butler v. Butler, 172 So.2d 899 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
70. Staples v. Staples, 168 So.2d 705 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
71. Under FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.4.
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treated as an application to intervene. Finally, when the former husband
has displayed a recalcitrant attitude in paying alimony, the chancellor
is justified in ordering that he give security for the future performance of
this obligation, and he may order him to deposit money in a secured
savings account as security.
72
Actual notice to a former husband is necessary upon a motion to
reduce an alimony award to judgment. However, the former husband's
statement that he did not receive notice in a foreign state where he was
living is not sufficient to authorize the court to vacate the judgment in the
absence of his denial that he was living at the address to which the notice
was sent or that the registered notice was returned to the sender.73
The Florida Supreme Court has sustained the third district's decision
in Naster v. Naster7 4 that in contempt proceedings for the failure of the
former husband to pay alimony the burden of proof is on the husband to
show that his failure to pay has not been wilful. In determining the ques-
tion of wilfulness, the chancellor may take into consideration the hus-
band's inability to pay together with other circumstances such as the
husband's failure to apply to the court for relief when the fact of inability
arises, as well as the fact that the husband has intentionally brought
about his financial incapacity. It would seem obvious that if the former
husband has suffered a decline in his financial ability to pay alimony, the
burden is on him to apply seasonably for a modification of the award; he
is courting disaster if he waits until his ex-wife brings contempt proceed-
ings.
Since the sequestration and application of a former husband's prop-
erty to the discharge of his alimony obligations under a divorce decree is
an equitable process, he should be entitled to the benefit of the value of
the property in reduction of his obligations. Hence, an ex-husband is
entitled to equitable relief when the trial court permits a former wife to
bid five thousand dollars upon the execution sale (initiated by her) for
property worth fifty thousand dollars with the result that only five thou-
sand dollars was to be credited towards the accrued alimony.7"
A mortgage executed solely by the husband of an estate by the
entirety is not absolutely void so that it cannot be given effect after a
divorce. The divorce converts the tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy
in common, and the mortgage given by the husband alone attaches to his
one-half interest. If the divorce decree awards the husband's interest to
the wife as lump sum alimony, she receives the property encumbered by
the mortgage.76
72. Carter v. Carter, 164 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
73. Davis v. Davis, 159 So.2d 879 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
74. Naster v. Naster, 163 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1964), affirming 151 So.2d 313 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1963).
75. Frell v. Frell, 162 So.2d 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
76. Hillman v. McCutchen, 166 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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G. Duration of an Award of Alimony
In response to certified questions from the United States Supreme
Court,7 the Supreme Court of Florida 78 has held that it is erroneous for a
chancellor to award alimony as a continuing charge against the former
husband's estate during the lifetime of the wife in the absence of any
agreement of the former husband to bind his estate. However, when an
erroneous decree of this nature has been entered and the husband has not
appealed from the decree and has acquiesced in making payments under
it for many years, it will not be subject to collateral attack in Florida or
in foreign states after the death of the husband. The main rule of the
above case was applied by the Florida Supreme Court in In re Freeland's
Estate.79 In Freeland a final decree of divorce provided "that by consent
of the parties and their solicitors ... an agreement has been reached, as
hereinafter set forth, providing for payment of permanent alimony."8 0
The decree then stated that permanent alimony was to be paid "during
the remainder of the life of the Plaintiff, or until the remarriage of the
Plaintiff .... ",81 There never was any written agreement as to the pay-
ment of alimony. The trial court and the majority of the district court
agreed that the above words obligated the former husband's estate for
the payment of alimony during the remainder of the ex-wife's lifetime so
long as she remained single, but the Florida Supreme Court held that
there was no agreement between the parties evidencing a clear intention
that the estate of the former husband was to be bound to continue the
payment of alimony.
VII. INTER-SPOUSAL PROPERTY RIoHTS
Although a court has power in a divorce action to award a husband's
interest in an estate by the entirety to the wife as lump sum alimony, or
because she may have a "special equity" in the property, the court lacks
the power to dispose of jointly held property unless the parties have
agreed to it, or unless the partition statutes are complied with." Even
though the complaint for divorce prays for a partition of the property
held as an estate by the entirety, the court has no jurisdiction to do so
unless appropriate pleadings asking for partition are filed subsequent to
the entry of the final decree of divorce.8
In the absence of a divorce, a court has no power to decree the liqui-
dation of the husband's interest in property. However, a court does have
77. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964).
78. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 163 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1964). For a prior note on this case see
Murray, Family Law, 18 U. MIAm-. L. REV. 231, 241, n.53 (1964).
79. 182 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1966), reversing Scott v. Gratigny, 166 So.2d 816 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964).
80. Id. at 426.
81. Id. at 426.
82. Kitchen v.oKitchen, 162 So.2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
83. Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 156 So.2d 206 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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power to adjudicate a dispute between the spouses involving the owner-
ship of property even in the absence of a divorce.84
The "special equity" interest rule of the wife was illustrated in
Perine v. Perine85 which held that the chancellor was correct in ruling
that certain jointly held property belonged to the wife because the hus-
band never contributed to the support of the family during the fourteen
years of married life and the property was purchased with the wife's
funds. Likewise, this "special equity" rule has been extended to a hus-
band who contributed the funds for the acquisition of a tenancy by the
entirety.86
The third district has held that a Florida court could enter a valid
judgment upholding the wife's claim of a lien against a non-resident hus-
band's "interest" in a tenancy by the entirety for unpaid separate main-
tenance payments. The property was purchased by the wife at a fore-
closure sale. The court was careful to state that it was only upholding the
validity of the judgment while not expressing any opinion about whether
it was erroneous. As a result of this holding, the court then upheld a judg-
ment (obtained in a subsequent suit) against the wife in favor of her
attorney for his services performed in the obtaining of the husband's
"interest" in this property by the wife. The court noted that the husband
might attack the original judgment "by independent proceedings in
equity."87 If this occurred and the husband was able to upset the decree
and recover his "interest," it would appear that the wife may be placed
in the unhappy position of having paid her attorney for work that was
not successful.
Inasmuch as a Florida statute88 provides that a tenancy by the
entirety is converted into a tenancy in common upon divorce, a divorce
decree which provides that the parties are to hold as joint tenants after
the divorce will be corrected upon appeal, even though the error of the
chancellor was not brought to his attention by a petition for rehearing.8"
When title to property is in the name of the husband alone and then
he and his wife execute a ninety-nine year lease which calls for payment
of the rents to the husband, there is insufficient evidence that he intended
to create an estate by the entirety in the unaccrued rents. Any implication
that the husband intended to create an estate by the entirety, because
of the inclusion of the wife's name as lessor, is refuted by the fact that
it was necessary for her to join in the execution of the lease in order to
release her inchoate right of dower during the term of the lease.90
84. Berlin v. Berlin, 174 So.2d 69 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
85. 175 So.2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
86. Burns v. Burns, 174 So.2d 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
87. Klausner v. Ader, 156 So.2d 193 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
88. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1963).
89. Wild v. Wild, 157 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
90. Cantor v. Palmer, 163 So.2d 508 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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In the absence of any evidence as to how the title to the property is
vested and the interests of the respective parties, it is error to award the
marital home to the husband, with right of occupancy to the wife, until
the property is sold in good faith to a bona fide purchaser."
The "divisible divorce" concept92 was further delineated by the
United States Supreme Court in Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l
Bank." A wife secured a separate maintenance decree in New York.
Later the husband secured an ex parte Florida divorce based upon con-
structive service. The former husband continued to comply with the re-
quirements of the New York decree despite his divorce. Upon the death
of the former husband, the former wife claimed dower on the grounds
that Florida could not, under the principles established in Estin v. Estin,94
constitutionally deny her a dower interest when the divorce was secured
by constructive service and she did not appear in the action. In distin-
guishing Estin, the court stated that Estin held that a Nevada court which
had no personal jurisdiction over the wife could not terminate the hus-
band's obligation to support the wife as provided by a New York separate
maintenance decree, while in the instant case, the former husband com-
plied with the New York decree until his death which terminated the
obligation of support under this decree. "[W]hen he died there was con-
sequently nothing left of the New York decree for Florida to dishonor."
The court then applied the rule of Pawley v. Pawley,95 that the inchoate
right of dower in Florida property was extinguished by a divorce decree
predicated upon constructive service. When joint checking accounts are
owned by the parties as an estate by the entirety and the wife has with-
drawn sums in a manner not consistent with the joint interests of the
parties, the chancellor may order the wife to return the money without
determining that she is guilty of fraud because the adjustment of prop-
erty rights during the divorce proceedings is in the nature of an account-
ing which is not dependent upon any finding of fraud. 6
The vexing evidentiary questions involving "donative intent" in
joint savings accounts in federal savings and loan associations should at
long last be cured by an amendment to section 665.15 of the Florida
Statutes97 which provides:
The establishment of a stock account, savings share account, or
investment share account in joint and survivorship form shall,
in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evi-
91. Davy v. Davy, 176 So.2d 379 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
92. See Note, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1233 (1963).
93. 381 U.S. 8"1 (1965).
94. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
95. 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950). For the question of dower in Florida, see generally
Swigert, Some Problems of Dower In Florida, 17 U. FLA. L. Rav. 368 (1964).
96. Beaty v. Beaty, 177 So.2d 54 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
97. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-463 (Emphasis added).
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dence, in any action or proceeding to which either the associa-
tion or the surviving shareholder or shareholders may be a
party, of the intention of all such shareholders or account
holders to vest title to such share accounts, and the additions
thereto, in such survivor or survivors.
VIII. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Grounds for an Award
Attorneys' contingent fee contracts in family matters are against
public policy and are unenforceable when they deal with alimony, sup-
port, or property settlements in lieu of support or alimony, but they are
valid when they deal with the return of the wife's separate property."
The rule allowing attorney's fees to a "wife" in a divorce action even
though the marriage is determined to be invalid has been extended to a
suit for alimony unconnected with divorce9" in which it is initially deter-
mined that the marriage is invalid.' 0
A former wife may be awarded attorney's fees under the Florida
statutes'01 when she is defending the provisions of a custody decree
against attack by the former husband in a court of chancery.0 2 This rule
has been extended to cases involving habeas corpus proceedings relative
to the custody of children when there is a property settlement agreement
to pay these fees.' 03 The third district has refused to extend these rules to
include a case where the former wife incurs attorney's fees in defending a
habeas corpus suit brought by her former husband and there was no
agreement to defray these fees.0 It is submitted that the statute'015 ought
to be amended by including a provision that the former wife is entitled to
attorney's fees in habeas corpus suits as well as in chancery suits as a
matter of law rather than agreement.
A former wife is entitled to attorney's fees when she resists her
former husband's efforts to modify a divorce decree, even when the modi-
fication extends only to visitation rights to the children who are in her
custody."0 6
The amount of fees to be awarded to attorneys in family matters
98. Salter v. St. Jean, 170 So.2d 94 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), distinguishing Sobieski v.
Maresco, 143 So.2d 62 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
99. Under FLA. STAT. § 65.09 (1963).
100. Dawson v. Dawson, 164 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
101. FLA. STAT. § 65.16 (1963).
102. McNeill v. McNeill, 59 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1952); Metz v. Metz, 108 So.2d 512 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1959).
103. O'Neal v. O'Neal, 158 So.2d 586 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), but see the strong dis-
sent of Pearson, J.
104. State v. Paine, 166 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
105. FLA. STAT. § 65.16 (1963).
106. Wilner v. Wilner, 167 So.2d 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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must be proved by expert testimony, and a court may not make an award
based solely upon the testimony of the interested attorney.
10
B. Appeals of Awards of Attorney's Fees
Although the wife's attorneys are entitled to an award of attorneys'
fees even though the case is not finally concluded by a decree of divorce
because of a settlement or reconciliation of the parties, the attorneys are
unable to appeal the award if they are dissatisfied with the amount since
they are not parties of record in the case, and, therefore, "they have no
standing to prosecute an appeal." 08
IX. ANTENUPTIAL AND SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
In a case of first impression, 10 9 the third district has held that ante-
nuptial agreements purporting to relieve a husband of any duty to pay
"alimony, temporary or permanent, attorney's fees, costs or separate
maintenance money""' 0 are void as being contrary to public policy. It has
previously been held that a bride-to-be may contract away her dower
rights by an antenuptial agreement,"' but the court refused to extend
this rule by analogy to the question of support.
In the absence of any fraudulent concealment or active misrep-
resentation by a husband-to-be, an antenuptial agreement will not be
set aside when the wife-to-be was represented by counsel and she had
"at least approximate knowledge of the potential resources of the pro-
spective husband.""' The fact that the assets of the parties, at the time of
the execution of the agreement, were disproportionate will not of itself
void the agreement if the wife-to-be was aware, or should have been
aware, of the disproportionate condition of their respective assets. Ante-
nuptial agreements should be upheld "particularly in view of the fact that
generally, as in this case, the complaining wife awaits until death has




Under a Florida statute"' the chancellor has the discretion to settle
alimony questions, and, as a result, the chancellor may approve all of the
107. Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So.2d 256 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
108. Hope v. Lipkin, 156 So.2d 659 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
109. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 163 So.2d 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
110. Id. at 337.
111. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
112. Compare Cantor v. Palmer, 166 So.2d 466 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), with the facts of
Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
113. Cantor v. Palmer, supra note 112, at 468.
114. FLA. STAT. § 65.08 (1963).
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provisions of a separation and property settlement agreement with the ex-
ception of those provisions dealing with alimony if he believes that they
were obtained by over-reaching and are unfair." 5 A property settlement
agreement, executed prior to a divorce suit, which provides for alimony
and child support payments, may be modified during the divorce proceed-
ings if the husband shows a change in the financial circumstances of the
parties." 6
Federal law prohibits the assignment of a United States War Risk
Insurance Policy or any agreement between the insured and another to
prevent the insured from changing the beneficiary of the policy." 7 In
Lindeburg v. Lindeburg"8 a husband and wife executed a property settle-
ment agreement (which was incorporated into a divorce decree) which
purported to obligate the husband to maintain such a policy for the
benefit of his wife. At the time of the husband's death, he had received
most of the face value of the policy, and his former wife brought suit
against his estate. The court upheld the agreement by stating that no
claim was being brought against the government, nor was the wife making
any claim under the policy; rather the cause of action was predicated
upon a contractual right enforceable against the estate and not upon the
policy of insurance itself. This bit of judicial dialectics would be envied
by the most subtle medieval philosophers.
In the absence of fraud, undue influence, duress or misrepresenta-
tion, a property settlement which is executed during the pendency of a
divorce and which provides for a fixed amount for the wife's attorneys'
fees is binding upon the parties and the court." 9
X. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
The first district has held that judicial constructions of sections 65.09
and 65.10 of the Florida statutes2 have practically merged the two sec-
tions so that under either section it is necessary for the wife to prove that
her husband has the ability to support her and any children of the mar-
riage and that he has failed to do so. If the husband is furnishing support
to the wife and children, she does not have a cause of action for separate
maintenance under either section. 2' The Legislature apparently agreed
with this case by repealing section 65.10 as a separate section and con-
solidating its provisions in an amended section 65.09.122 In separate main-
115. Dawkins v. Dawkins, 172 So.2d 633 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
116. Rieder v. Rieder, 157 So.2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), construing FLA. STAT. § 65.15
(1963).
117. 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1965).
118. 162 So.2d I (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
119. D'Amato v. D'Amato, 176 So.2d 907 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
120. FLA. STAT. §§ 65.09, 65.10 (1963).
121. Wood v. Wood, 166 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
122. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-498.
[VOL. XX
FAMILY LAW
tenance proceedings under either section (former sections 65.09 and
65.10) the court does not have the power to order a division of the
property of the parties. 2 It would not appear that the consolidation of
these sections will change this result.
In Dawson v. Dawson"2 4 the court held that a court has no power to
award separate maintenance unless the plaintiff is married to the defen-
dant. In Dawson a man and woman journeyed to Mexico, and the man
secured a divorce from his wife who was an inmate in the Florida State
Mental Hospital. The man and woman then went through a Mexican
marriage ceremony and returned to Florida. The court held that the rela-
tionship was meretricious from the beginning, and that the parties were
guilty of bad faith in flaunting the laws of Florida by resorting to a
spurious divorce. The court refused to hold that the "husband" was
estopped from denying his marriage, but from the tenor of the decision it
would appear that the doctrine of estoppel would be unavailing in any
case because the court lacks the power to award separate maintenance
unless a marriage relationship exists.
When a wife brings a suit for alimony unconnected with divorce,
the court has no power to force a divorce upon her against her will under
a prayer for general relief in the complaint. 25
The Nevada Supreme Court has held that a Florida separate main-
tenance decree obtained by the wife in ex parte proceedings after personal
service of process on the husband does not bar his Nevada divorce action
based upon the cruelty of his wife even though his charges could have
been litigated in the Florida proceeding. The Nevada court refused to
consider itself bound by the Florida notions of res judicata or collateral
estoppel but used its own definitions in weighing the full faith and credit
effect of the Florida decree.' 26 As previously indicated in this article, 27
the Florida courts have been giving somewhat similar treatment to sepa-
rate maintenance decrees of New York which are asserted as a bar to
divorce proceedings in Florida.
XI. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
A. Custody
Neither a juvenile judge nor a chancellor is required to make specific
findings of fact as to the fitness or unfitness of the parents in entering a
custody order; an indication in the decree that the award is based upon
the best interests of the children is sufficient.
28
123. Rambo v. Rambo, 155 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). As to the property rights,
accord, Kitchen v. Kitchen, 162 So.2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
124. 164 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
125. Daniel v. Daniel, 171 So.2d 180 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
126. Clark v. Clark, 389 P.2d 69 (Nev. 1964).
127. Note 31 supra.
128. In the Interest of F., 166 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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The fact that a court-appointed psychiatrist's report is "objectively,
less than reassuring as to appellee's [the wife's] mental stability and
fitness"' 29 will not justify an appellate court's reversing the chancellor
who awarded custody of the children to her. Custody of a seven year old
boy and a three year old girl should be awarded to their mother, rather
than to their paternal grandparents, when the record fails to disclose the
mother's lack of fitness or moral standards. The fact that the paternal
grandparents are able to provide more financially than the mother can
is merely one, but not the primary consideration.180
B. Modification of Custody
It is not an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to refuse to modify
an award of custody (which gave custody to the father) upon petition of
the former wife who had remarried within three weeks after the divorce.
Sufficient time had not elapsed to evidence the stability of the former
wife's second marriage."" Likewise, when a father has been granted cus-
tody of the children, the mere fact that the mother has remarried, and is
now more affluent than her former husband, is not sufficient to justify a
change of custody. If the change in the financial condition is coupled with
improper care of the children by the father, then, of course, a change
of custody will be in order.3 2
Custody decrees of a foreign state are not entitled to full faith and
credit, nor are they res judicata "except as to facts before the court [the
foreign court] at the time of the Judgment."'' Hence, they may be modi-
fied at any time upon a showing of a change in circumstances.
C. Enforcement
In State v. Bettner"s4 a mother had been given custody of children
by a foreign divorce decree, but she left the children with their maternal
grandparents in Florida. A petition for habeas corpus was served upon
the grandparents by the father, and the mother took the children from
Florida to New York. The court held that the grandparents could not be
held in contempt in the absence of proof that they removed the children
from Florida.
D. Visitation Rights
It is proper for a chancellor to qualify the father's visitation rights
by providing that he "shall not take the minor children in an airplane
129. Harrison v. Harrison, 165 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
130. Kelly v. Kelly, 163 So.2d 498 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
131. Longstreth v. Frischkorn, 171 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
132. Ritsi v. Ritsi, 160 So.2d 159 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
133. O'Neal v. O'Neal, 158 So.2d 586, 587 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
134. 158 So.2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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other than a certified carrier"'185 even though he is a qualified pilot,
though not for a certified carrier. This restriction was upheld because of
"the dangers incident to the type of flights suggested here."' 88
When there is a petition for modification of a divorce decree, there
should be a hearing where evidence may be introduced. However, when
the petition for modification is, in fact, a request that a mistake in the
wording of the decree be corrected as to the rights of visitation by the
father, it would appear that the chancellor may deny the introduction of
evidence which indicates that it might be unsafe to allow the husband to
visit his child alone. Of course, the wife may petition for a modification
of the visitation provisions of the decree upon this ground.'87
The second district has seemingly characterized an amended final
decree which provided that the wife was to have' custody of a daughter
every other week-end and during a thirty day period during June, July or
August of each year as an enlargement of "visitation" rights rather than
as an order for divided custody which would be condemned under prior
authority.
E. Child Support and Basis for the Award
In a case of first impression,'8 9 the first district has held that a father
has the duty to support an adult child who is incapacitated because of
mental or physical infirmities, who has never married and who has lived
with her mother since birth. It is error to order the sale of property held
as an estate by the entirety in order to use the proceeds to establish a
trust fund for the college education of the minor children of the parties
to a divorce suit.
40
F. Modification of the Award
It is erroneous for a chancellor to refuse to award travel and main-
tenance expenses to a non-resident wife incurred in defending a Florida
divorce suit merely because the wife received child support (pursuant to
a foreign decree) for six years after the child became an adult. It is in-
cumbent upon a former husband to seek modification of a child support
decree when the child reaches his majority, and the wife should not be
penalized for continuing to accept payments after the child's majority if
the husband fails to seek modification.' 4 '
135. Sutter v. Sutter, 172 So.2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
136. Id. at 911.
137. McLeod v. McLeod, 172 So.2d 274 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
138. McCown v. McCown, 167 So.2d 250, 252 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
139. Fincham v. Levin, 155 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). This case was decided
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law, FLA. STAT. § 88 (1963).
140. Allen v. Allen, 158 So.2d 546 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), following Weinstein v. Wein-
stein, 148 So.2d 737 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
141. Hohweiler v. Hohweiler, 167 So.2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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A court should reduce the amount of child support upon petition of
the father when the re-marriage of the mother has resulted in a substan-
tial reduction of the amount necessary for the support of the minor
child.142 On the other hand, it is erroneous to relieve a father of all liabil-
ity for support of his minor child after his former wife (who has custody)
enters into a subsequent marriage. This is true even though the wife has
succeeded in having the child's name changed to that of her new husband.
Further, it is improper to relieve the former husband of liability for ali-
mony and child support which accrued between the entry of the final
decree and the wife's remarriage. If the original decree failed to allocate
amounts for alimony and child support but provided a lump sum for
both, it is the former wife's responsibility to petition the court to make
an apportionment for child support upon her re-marriage if she intends
to seek collection of child support subsequent to her re-marriage. 43
It is proper for a chancellor to refuse to clarify the unambiguous
child support provisions of a final decree of divorce without prejudice to
the right of the former wife to file a petition for modification of the child
support provisions because of a change of circumstances occurring since
the final decree.' 44
G. Enforcement of the Award
A sentence of an ex-husband to jail for contempt for his failure to
pay support payments to his ex-wife must provide for a sentence for a
definite period of time coupled with a provision that the contemnor may
secure his release at any time during the sentence by payment of the
accrued support payments.' 45
H. Collateral Attack on Award
A divorce decree which requires a husband to support a minor child
who was not adopted by the parties but who had been placed in their
custody by the order of a foreign court is not void, "although it may have
been erroneous and subject to reversal on appeal."' 46 In the absence of
an appeal, the decree cannot be attacked under the Florida statutes'47
or under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. 48
XII. ADOPTION
The consent of the father of an illegitimate child is not necessary for
the adoption of the child by another, nor does the father have any stand-
142. Boyle v. Boyle, 164 So.2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
143. Plager v. Perlmutter, 159 So.2d 273 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
144. Harrell v. Harrell, 171 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
145. State v. Anderson, 168 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
146. Teply v. Key, 158 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
147. FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1963).
148. FLA. R. App. P. 1.38(b).
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ing to contest the adoption merely because he has been supporting the
child. His voluntary support is no more than a compliance with his legal
responsibilities.14 9
In a case of first impression, 5° the second district has held that a
child who is adopted after the execution of a will is a pretermitted child,
entitled to a child's part of the estate under the Florida statute. 5'
The Florida statutes provide that an adopted child is the "legal
heir"'5 2 and "lineal descendant of his adopting parents."' 153 As a result,
when property is devised or bequeathed to an adopting parent who dies
before the testator, the legacy or devise does not lapse154 and the adopted
child takes the property in the same manner as the devisee or legatee
would have done had he survived the testator.'
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently held that the
failure to notify a father of the pendency of adoption proceedings insti-
tuted by his former wife and her new husband is a deprivation of due
process of law which renders the adoption decree constitutionally invalid.
This constitutional infirmity would not be cured by a hearing, granted to
the former husband upon his petition to set aside the decree, because the
burden which was placed upon him to show affirmatively that he had con-
tributed to the support of his child during the preceding two year period
(as required by the law of Texas) would not have been placed upon him
if he had been given notice of the proceedings at the beginning.'56
Section 72.22 of the Florida Statutes has been amended157 to provide
that an adopting parent may maintain an action for the wrongful death
of his adopted child while the natural parent or parents are deprived of
this right after adoption.
XIII. JUVENILES AND JUVENILE COURTS
A. Jurisdiction
Juvenile courts are empowered to deal with the custody of children
who are delinquent or dependent, or both. In addition, the Juvenile Court
149. Clements v. Banks, 159 So.2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
150. In re Frizzell's Estate, 156 So.2d 558 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
151. FLA. STAT. § 731.11 (1963).
152. FLA. STAT. §§ 72.22, 72.38 (1963).
153. FiA. STAT. § 731.30 (1963).
154. FLA. STAT. § 731.20 (1963).
155. In re Baker's Estate, 172 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
156. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
157. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-384. The Attorney General has ruled (under chapters 28
and 72 of the Florida Statutes) that a final decree in adoption cases may be recorded only
in the names of the petitioners seeking the adoption and that the name of the child
neither before or after adoption shall appear in the public record of the clerk's office out-
side of the court file. Further, if it is impracticable to obliterate the name of the child
from the final decree, the decree shall not be recorded and shall only be indexed as provided
by FLA. STAT. § 72.27 (1963). FLA. Air'y GaE. Op. 064-89 (July 14, 1964).
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in Dade County has the power to act in regard to the custody of children
even when they are not delinquent or dependent.'58 However, this addi-
tional power of the Dade County Juvenile Court does not authorize it to
determine the question of fitness for custody of one of the natural parents
unless the question is presented in a court of competent jurisdiction in
divorce, separate maintenance, or on habeas corpus to determine custody.
The court has no power to entertain a declaratory decree action that one
spouse is unfit to have custody. Further, when a former wife has initiated
a so-called declaratory decree action of this nature, the court cannot take
custody from her and award it to her former husband in the absence of
any pleading filed by him. It constitutes a denial of due process.5 9
In a county which does not have a separate juvenile court, the county
judge is also denominated as a juvenile judge.' 60 The juvenile court has
exclusive-original jurisdiction over dependent children living within the
county.'' As a result, the county-juvenile court judge has jurisdiction
over a case brought by a guardian of a dependent child against the child's
father for an increase of a child support award entered by a foreign
court.0 2
The circuit court for Broward County does not have the power to
transfer a child custody matter to the Juvenile Court of Dade County;
the power to transfer is limited within the county."'
In a rather cloudy opinion," the first district has seemingly held
that when a juvenile court has taken jurisdiction over children as being
"dependent" and awarded custody to their father, jurisdiction will remain
with the juvenile court when the wife later files suit for alimony uncon-
nected with divorce and for temporary custody of the children. The court
seemingly construed the Florida Constitution and statutes as requiring
this holding.0 5 However, the court, in citing Ponce v. Children's Home
Soc'y of Florida' as controlling authority, quoted an extract from this
opinion which was couched in language to the effect that although the
chancellor had jurisdiction over the children he should defer to the
juvenile court.
Two of the district courts are in apparent conflict over the question
of jurisdiction over children who have been committed to an industrial
school. The second district has held" 7 that a child who has been com-
mitted by a juvenile court to an industrial school as a delinquent child
158. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 27000, § 3.
159. In re My, 162 So.2d 551 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
160. FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1963).
161. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(10), 39.02(1) (1963).
162. Conrad v. Rose, 173 So.2d 762 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
163. In the interest of M, 166 So.2d 154 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
164. Perdue v. Perdue, 155 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
165. FLA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 6(3), 12, and FLA. STAT. §§ 65.14, 39.02 (1963).
166. Ponce v. Children's Home Soc'y, 97 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1957).
167. Dixon v. State, 155 So.2d 632 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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is under the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the government, and,
therefore, a mother who obtained the release of her child by lying to the
officials of the industrial school cannot be in contempt of the juvenile
court. The first district has held"" (in an opinion which was seemingly
tacitly approved by the Florida Supreme Court.69) that the juvenile court
does not lose jurisdiction over children who have been committed to an
industrial school as delinquent children and the court may subsequently
order their release and return to the control of their parents under the
supervision of the court.
A Florida statute170 provides that when a minor moves to have his
felony case removed from the juvenile court to the court which would
have jurisdiction if he were an adult, the juvenile court judge's jurisdic-
tion is limited to ordering the transfer and he has no jurisdiction to con-
duct a hearing in order to determine which particular criminal court
should have jurisdiction.'
A sentence of one year at hard labor in the county jail imposed by
a juvenile court for criminal contempt is void. The Florida statutes
172
permit a sentence at hard labor to be imposed against a convict, but
criminal contempt is not a crime and the contemnor is therefore not a
convict.
173
The Attorney General has ruled that when a juvenile court judge,
acting pursuant to the Florida statutes,7 waives jurisdiction and trans-
fers a case against a juvenile to a court which would have jurisdiction if
the child were an adult, the child is subject to imprisonment as if he were
an adult.'
Section 39.02(1) of the Florida Statutes has been amended to pro-
vide that the juvenile court, upon the filing of a petition and the holding
of a hearing, may revoke or suspend the driver's license of a child upon
a finding that the child has violated a federal law, state law or city
ordinance relating to the operation of a motor vehicle without adjudicat-
ing the child to be delinquent .
7
B. Dependent and Delinquent
A child will be considered "dependent" if she is without proper pa-
rental care and supervision,'177 and a child may be found to be "dependent"
168. A.N.E. v. State, 156 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
169. State v. Walters, 158 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1963).
170. FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (1963).
171. State v. Culbreath, 168 So.2d 339 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
172. FLA. STAT. § 922.05(2) (1963).
173. State v. Boyer, 166 So.2d 694 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
174. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(1) (1963).
175. FLA. ATT'y GEN. Op. 063.99 (Aug. 12, 1963).
176. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-219.
177. O'Brien v. Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, 161 So.2d 220 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964).
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even though the custodian-mother has financial means because "the stat-
ute17s . ..clearly encompasses conditions other than financial necessity
for public welfare." '179
A juvenile court will not be considered as having abused its discre-
tion in revoking probation and reinstating an order of commitment when
the juvenile court files "indicate a strong trend of delinquent and in-
corrigible conduct on the part of"' 80 the juvenile.
The purpose of the Legislature in enacting the juvenile courts acts
was to provide a forum which could consider the problems of dependent
children in an informal fashion without the necessity of applying the
technicalities that often accompany routine litigation. Therefore, the
court may treat a "petition for re-hearing" as a petition for modification
of visitation rights in a prior custody award and order a change in custody
even though no witnesses were sworn and the court heard only the parties
and their counsel.' 8'
C. Appeals
The Florida statute,' which provides that in appeals from the juve-
nile courts to the district courts of appeal it is not necessary to file any
briefs or papers other than the juvenile court file, has been superseded by
the Florida Appellate Rules which require the filing of assignments of
error, directions to the clerk, records on appeal and briefs.'
D. Juveniles and Criminal Procedure
In the absence of allegations that a minor is a near mental defective,
it would seem that he is competent to waive the appointment of counsel
in a criminal case.'84 The same district court in the prior decision of
Mullins v. State' seemed to articulate greater safeguards for this "in-
telligent waiver" concept that it did in the subsequent case. In Mullins
the minor alleged that when he pleaded guilty to a felony charge he was
insolvent; that he was not advised of full knowledge of the charge against
him; that his mother, who accompanied him at the trial, was also an in-
solvent with only a fifth grade education; that she stated that she did not
desire counsel for her son because she was financially unable to retain
counsel; and that the judge failed to advise her that her son was entitled
to court-appointed counsel if she desired one. The trial court held a hear-
ing under Criminal Procedure Rule 1, but ruled that "the merits of the
178. FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (1963).
179. In the Interest of W.S.B., 157 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
180. In the Matter of J.S.D., 156 So.2d 780, 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
181. In re M, 176 So.2d 600 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
182. FLA. STAT. § 39.14 (1963).
183. A.N.E. v. State, 167 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
184. Mankus v. State, 161 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
185. Mullins v. State, 157 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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motion and its grounds did not warrant the production of the prisoner
at the hearing."' 86 The first district reversed, holding that if the minor
proved his allegations at a new hearing there clearly was no effective
waiver of his constitutional right to counsel. The lower court was directed
to permit the minor, or his court-appointed counsel, full opportunity to
present evidence "in support of the allegations of the motion, particularly
with reference to the critical issue of competent and intelligent waiver."' 87
In a case of first impression, the second district has held that the
Florida statute' which requires that notice be given to the parents or
guardian of an unmarried minor when he is being charged with a crime
prior to the trial is not satisfied by the fact that a minor may be repre-
sented by counsel at the trial. Notice must be given to the parents or
guardian regardless of the presence of counsel. Further, the wilful with-
holding or the wilful giving of false information by the minor as to the
whereabouts of his parents or guardian will constitute a waiver of the
statute, provided that the court or the executive officers of the court
pursue reasonable measures in attempting to ascertain the whereabouts




The holding in the case of In re Guardianship of Mickler,90 which
was criticized by the author in the last Survey,'9' has been reversed by
the Florida Supreme Court. 92 The court held that venue and jurisdiction
are not synonymous terms in guardianship matters. When an incompetent
had lived for many years in Hernando County and was then moved by a
friend (later appointed guardian) to Taylor County a short time before
guardianship proceedings were instituted, either county had power-in
the sense of jurisdiction-to conduct guardianship proceedings. However,
the venue was properly in Hernando County in the absence of any waiver
by the next of kin of the incompetent as to the appointment of a guardian
in Taylor County.
Since jurisdiction is vested in both the county judge's court of the
county where the incompetent resides, as well as in the county in which
he may be found, an incompetent, after he has regained his sanity, may
not collaterally attack the adjudication of incompetency entered by the
county judge of the county where the incompetent was found, even though
the proper venue was in a different county where the incompetent resided.
The county judge who has entered the adjudication of incompetency also
186. Id. at 704.
187. Id. at 705.
188. FLA. STAT. § 932.38 (1963).
189. Milligan v. State, 177 So.2d 75 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
190. 152 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
191. Murray, Family Law, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 231, 258 (1964).
192. In re Guardianship of Mickler, 163 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1964).
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has jurisdiction to order the sale of the incompetent's property, but he
has no jurisdiction to determine the title to property located in a different
county.
193
The county judge's court does not have power to award fees to guard-
ians and attorneys in guardianship proceedings for services performed
subsequent to the ward's being declared competent. Of course, fees may
be awarded for services performed prior to the date that the ward is de-
clared competent, even though the award is made afterwards. 9 '
An unclassified diagnosis of schizophrenia is insufficient to support
an adjudication of incompetency under the Florida statutes; 9 ' the de-
terminative question is not:
whether the person is suffering from a mental illness, is in need
of psychiatric treatment, is in need of counseling, is staying
out of trouble, or is leading a normal life. The pertinent ques-
tion presented to the judge in cases such as this is whether
the alleged incompentent is suffering from a mental illness
to such an extent that he is incapable of caring for himself,
or managing his property or is likely to dissipate or lose his
property or become the victim of designing persons. 96
Florida Statute section 394.22(16) was amended by deleting the
former thirty day observation requirement for restoring to mental com-
petency. 7
Sections 965.01(4) and 965.04(3) were amended by providing for
the creation of a "Division of Mental Retardation" which is charged with
the responsibility "for the planning, development and coordination of a
complete and comprehensive state-wide program for the mentally re-
tarded."'""
Chapter 394 of the Florida Statutes was amended by the addition
of a provision which empowers the staff of a state hospital to release
patients for "trial visits" to their homes after it has been determined
'from observation, examination and treatment that the patients would
benefit from these visits.'
Section 745.121 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide
that upon entry of an order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction,
the guardian shall have the power to hold any corporate stock, mutual
investment trust share, registered bonds, notes, debentures, or revenue
certificates issued by any corporation, government, municipality, or sub-
193. Bambrick v. Bambrick, 165 So.2d 449 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
194. Poling v. City Bank & Trust Co., 167 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
195. FLA. STAT. ch. 394 (1963).
196. In re Pickles' Petition, 170 So.2d 603, 613 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
197. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-5.
198. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-14.
199. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-23.
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division or agencies thereof, in the name of the guardian or in the name
of one or more joint guardians, or in the name of a nominee, with or
without disclosing any fiduciary relationship. The guardian shall be re-
sponsible for his own acts or omissions and for the acts or omissions of
the nominees of such property. °
Section 828.04 of the Florida Statutes was amended by increasing
the scope of the crimes of torturing and unlawfully depriving children of
food, clothing, support and shelter and providing for a penalty of im-
prisonment not exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars, or both.201
Section 828.042 of the Florida Statutes was enacted providing that
whoever negligently deprives a child under the age of sixteen of necessary
food, clothing or shelter, and "whoever negligently and without malice
deprives of necessary sustenance or raiment, or negligently and without
malice deprives of necessary treatment and attention his child or ward"
is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not exceeding
six months, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or both.20 2
Sections 710.02-05 and 710.07 of the Florida Statutes have been
amended to include life insurance policies and annuity contracts which
are on the life of a minor or a member of his family within the provisions
of the Florida Gifts to Minors Act. 3
The Uniform Principal and Income Law, chapter 690 of the Florida
Statutes, has been made applicable to the principal and income of the
estates of wards. 0 4
Section 744.40 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
letters of guardianship shall be issued to the guardian of the person or
of the property or both, but failure to issue letters shall not affect the
validity of the order appointing the guardian.05
XV. ILLEGITIMACY
In a bastardy proceeding it is not sufficient merely to allege that the
plaintiff is the mother and natural guardian of a child who is the natural
child of the defendant. Under the Florida statutes, °6 it is necessary that
the plaintiff allege that she is an unmarried woman and that the child is
a bastard. Unless the child is born to the plaintiff out of wedlock the
plaintiff has no cause of action under the statute. 7
200. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-106.
201. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-113.
202. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-113.
203. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-354.
204. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-205.
205. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-285.
206. FLA. STAT. §§ 742.011, 742.021 (1963).
207. Lorenz v. Jiminez, 163 So.2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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A Florida statute208 provides for a four year statute of limitations in
bastardy actions which begins to run from the time of the child's birth
or four years after the last payment made by the father for the child's
support. If the mother files suit more than four years after the child was
born and the alleged father moves for a summary judgment which is sup-
ported by an affidavit which fails to make any mention of whether any
support payments were made by him, the court may not enter a summary
judgment because all doubts as to the existence of a material fact must
be resolved against the moving party. Further, since statutes of limita-
tions relate to the remedy, the Legislature may increase the period of
limitations from three to four years when the original cause of action
has not become barred under the former statute.09
Section 856.04 of the-Florida Statutes has been amended to provide
that a father who deserts or wilfully withholds the means of support from
his illegitimate child after he has been adjudged to be the father of such
child by a court of competent jurisdiction of Florida or any other juris-
diction shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not
more than two years or by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or
both.
210
Section 39.11(1) of the Florida Statutes has been amended to pro-
vide that the juvenile court judge has the power to order support pay-
ments from a father of an illegitimate child who acknowledges his pater-
nity in writing before the judge.2n
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Meretricious Relationship and Constructive Trusts
Mutual promises to live together in a meretricious relationship are
not legal consideration to support a partnership agreement. However,
when a married woman has reposed trust and confidence in her married
paramour and she has contributed property and money for the acquisi-
tion of property for their mutual benefit, but the paramour has placed
the title to the property in his own name or in the name of corporations,
the court may impose a constructive trust against the widow, estate and
heirs of her paramour.212
B. Wills and Estates
In Bauer v. Reese"'3 the first district has held that under the Florida
statutes214 the will of a husband leaving property to his wife is revoked
208. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(9) (1963).
209. Patterson v. Sodders, 167 So.2d 789 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
210. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-210.
211. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-462.
212. Botsikas v. Yarmack, 172 So.2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
213. 161 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). Noted 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 646 (1965).
214. FLA. STAT. § 731.101 (1963).
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by their divorce and their subsequent re-marriage to each other does not
reactivate or reestablish the will. The will left only the homestead to the
wife. Since the will was held revoked by the divorce, the husband died
intestate and his widow was his sole heir. It is wondered if the draftsman
of his statute ever visualized this situation?
In a case of first impression,215 the third district has held that the
common law duty of a husband to pay for his wife's funeral expenses is
abrogated when the wife leaves a will providing for the payment of her
funeral expenses out of her estate.
C. Torts
A father does not have a cause of action for the wrongful death of
his minor daughter who, at the time of her death, was married and living
with her husband. The fact that the daughter's husband dies soon after
her death does not affect this result.
2 16
An unemployed married woman living with, and supported by, her
husband may not recover medical expenses from a tortfeasor when her
husband has not joined in the suit, and she has failed to allege and prove
that she has any separate property, or that she has obligated any of her
separate property for these medical expenses.
21 7
D. Homestead Exemption
In a case of first impression,218 the Florida Supreme Court has held
that it is legally possible for a married woman in good faith to claim a
permanent home in Florida property for purposes of homestead tax ex-
emption even though her husband is legally domiciled out of the state and
she continues to live in a "congenial" marital relationship with him.
215. Garett v. Rawlings, 167 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
216. Guarniere v. Henderson, 171 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
217. O'Quinn v. Central Truck Lines, Inc., 157 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
218. Judd v. Schooley, 158 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1963).
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